

## ISLE OF ANGLESEY COUNTY COUNCIL

<b>REPORT TO:</b>	<b>EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE</b>
<b>DATE:</b>	<b>19 DECEMBER 2016</b>
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	<b>TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2017/18</b>
<b>LEAD OFFICER:</b>	<b>MARC JONES</b>
<b>CONTACT OFFICER:</b>	<b>GARETH ROBERTS (TEL: EXT 2675)</b>

### **Nature and reason for reporting**

To review - consistent with professional guidance.

### **Nature and reason for reporting**

The Council is required to implement best practice in accordance with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management which recommends that, prior to being presented for adoption, Members should scrutinise the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, the annual MRP Policy Statement, the annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation). This Authority's Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation charges the Audit Committee with this function and Annex A to this report was presented to the Audit Committee on 6 December 2016. This report complies with the 2016/17 Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation, which requires this committee to receive and review this report prior to being passed to the full Council for approval. This report runs alongside the capital and revenue budget reports as part of the 2017/18 budget setting process.

### **A - Recommendation/s and reason/s**

1. This report and Annex (as detailed in the section above, sections 2 to 4 below and including Annex A) was presented to the Audit Committee on 6 December 2016. That Committee resolved to:-

  - Note the contents of the covering report; and
  - Endorse the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (including the Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators) [Annex A] for 2017/18.

The Audit Committee did not resolve to pass any comments or recommendations on to this Committee.
2. The CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management (Section 7) recommends that the Authority's Treasury Management Practices (TMPs) should be approved, documented and monitored. It goes on to state that the nature and extent of the involvement of an organisation's responsible body in approving and monitoring its TMPs and accompanying schedules is a matter for local decision and recognises that in some organisations this may be delegated to the responsible officer. In all cases it should be subjected to scrutiny by the responsible body following recommendations by the responsible officer. In previous years, this Authority did not have documented TMPs. The Authority have now produced documented TMPs, and were be presented to the Audit Committee on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2016.
3. In terms of updates to the Treasury Management Strategy Statement the only proposed amendment to the core principals and policies of the 2016/17 Statement is to include Money Market Funds as an additional investment option to the Counterparty Criteria (Appendix 6) The reason for this is to create additional secure options for the Council's investments. Only AAA rated Money Market Funds will be used.

4. The Council's external borrowing stood at £110.7m as at 10 November 2016, this is expected to be the position at 31 March 2017. The borrowing is made up of fixed and variable rate. The fixed rate borrowing stood at £110.5m with an average life of 22 years, and average interest rate of 5.41%. The variable rate of borrowing stood at £0.2m with an average life of 9 years and an average interest rate of 9.41%. The anticipated cost of borrowing, which is the interest payable on existing loans, for 2016/17, is £6.0m for both the General Fund (£4.0m) and HRA (£2.0m). There will also be a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) charge, which is the revenue charge to pay off an element of the accumulated capital spend each year (Appendix 2). In 2016/17 this charge will be £4.4m for both the General Fund (£3.5m) and HRA (£0.9m). This means that the Capital Finance Requirement (the forecast underlying need to borrow to finance the capital programme) at the year end will be £135.5m, resulting in the Council being internally borrowed (see section 3.3.1) by £24.8m by the year end.

The Council's investments as at 10 November 2016 stood at £20.3m with an average rate of return of 0.33% and the average balance for the year to date is £20.8m. As internal borrowing has increased the investment balances have decreased.

**5. Recommendations:-**

5.1 Note the contents of the covering report.

5.2 Endorse the contents of, and assumptions and proposals made within, the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (including the Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators) for 2017/18 (Annex A to this report).

5.3 To pass on any comments and/or recommendations to the County Council.

**B - What other options did you consider and why did you reject them and/or opt for this option**

n/a

**C - Why is this a decision for the Executive?**

To comply with this Authority's budget setting process and Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation.

**CH - Is this decision consistent with policy approved by the full Council?**

Yes

**D - Is this decision within the budget approved by the Council?**

Yes

**DD - Who did you consult?**

**What did they say?**

1	Chief Executive / Strategic Leadership Team (SLT) (mandatory)	
2	Finance / Section 151 (mandatory)	n/a – this is a S151 Officer report
3	Legal / Monitoring Officer (mandatory)	
4	Human Resources (HR)	
5	Property	
6	Information Communication Technology (ICT)	
7	Scrutiny	
8	Local Members	
9	Any external bodies / other/s	

**E - Risks and any mitigation (if relevant)**

1	Economic	
2	Anti-poverty	
3	Crime and Disorder	
4	Environmental	
5	Equalities	
6	Outcome Agreements	
7	Other	

**F - Annexes:**

Annex A: Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Prudential and Treasury Indicators for 2017/18.

**FF - Background papers (please contact the author of the Report for any further information):**

- Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2016/17 (as approved by the Council on 10 March 2016)

**TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT****ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY, MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION POLICY STATEMENT AND TREASURY MANAGEMENT POLICY STATEMENT 2017/18****1. Introduction****1.1 Background**

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, meaning that total income due during the financial year must be sufficient to meet expenditure, and also that actual cash inflows must be adequate to cover cash outflows. A key part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's policy to minimise risk ensuring adequate liquidity before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

A particular point is that a local authority must calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that:-

- increases in revenue costs resulting from increases in interest charges, incurred to finance additional borrowing to finance capital expenditure; and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects, must be limited to a level which is affordable within the Council's projected income.

The Treasury Management Policy Statement defines the policies and objectives of the treasury management activities. See Appendix 10.

**1.2 Reporting Requirements**

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit Committee.

**Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators and Treasury Strategy** - The first and most important report, covers:-

- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury management indicators;
- an Investment Strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- a Treasury Management Policy Statement (definition of the policies and objectives of the treasury management function); and
- the capital plans (including the associated prudential indicators).

**A Mid-Year Treasury Management Report** - This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting its objectives or whether any policies require revision.

**An Annual Treasury Report** - This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury management indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2017/18**

The strategy for 2017/18 covers two main areas:-

#### **Capital Issues**

- The capital plans and the prudential indicators; and
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

#### **Treasury management Issues**

- The current treasury position;
- treasury management indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, the Welsh Government MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the Welsh Government Investment Guidance.

### **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny. In order to support the scrutiny role of the members of the Audit Committee, the committee's members received training in treasury management, delivered by the appointed treasury management consultants on November 9 2016. Further training will be arranged when required.

The training needs of treasury management officers are regularly reviewed and addressed.

### **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Capita Asset Services, – Treasury Solutions (herein referred to as Capita) as its external treasury management advisors. In accordance with procurement regulations the Treasury Management advisory service were advertised for tender for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2019 with an option to extend for 2 years, with Capita Asset Services being the successful tender.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## 1.6 Adoption of the Code

The Council is required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The current, 2011, code of practice has already been adopted by this Council therefore no update is required for 2016/17. In addition the authority follows guidance in the CIPFA Prudential Code 2013 which supplements the CIPFA code of practice on Treasury Management.

## 2. Capital Considerations

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

The Authority's capital expenditure projections for 2016/17 to 2019/20 are reflected in the Prudential Indicators (Appendix 11). The projected expenditure for 2017/18 to 2019/20 is based on the draft capital programme recommended for approval by The Executive at its meeting 7 November 2016 in accordance with the Capital Strategy. The projections for those years also includes the assumption that slippage from 2016/17 will be fully spent in 2017/18.

The overall programmes will be limited to what is affordable, both in terms of actual capital spend and in terms of the revenue implications (see 1.1 above). The prudential indicators are contained in Appendix 11.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need, which can be seen in table 3.1.

<b>Capital expenditure £'000m</b>	<b>2015/16 Actual</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate</b>
Non-HRA	16,368	30,911	35,797	38,573	29,031
HRA	27,608	12,151	9,889	7,283	7,523
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,976</b>	<b>43,062</b>	<b>45,602</b>	<b>45,856</b>	<b>36,554</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>					
Capital receipts	3,818	6,585	1,763	500	500
Capital grants	13,998	14,375	24,942	33,685	24,450
Capital reserves	115	888	1,070	0	0
Revenue	2,905	8,936	9,377	4,618	4,858
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>23,140</b>	<b>12,278</b>	<b>8,450</b>	<b>7,053</b>	<b>6,746</b>

### 3. Borrowing

The capital expenditure plans, set out in section 2 (above) of this report, provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury/prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

#### 3.1 Current and Projected Borrowing Requirement and Actual Borrowing

The forecast movements in the Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) are:-

<b>ESTIMATED MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT BORROWING 2016/17 TO 2019/20</b>				
	<b>2016/17 Projected £'000</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2019/20 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>Movement in the CFR</b>				
New borrowing to support capital expenditure				
<i>Supported Borrowing</i>	6,375	3,472	3,416	3,339
<i>Unsupported Borrowing</i>	5,903	4,978	3,637	3,407
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,278</b>	<b>8,450</b>	<b>7,053</b>	<b>6,746</b>
<i>Reduce by: Minimum Revenue Provision and set aside capital receipts</i>	(4,455)	(4,688)	(4,718)	(4,762)
<b>Net movement in the CFR</b>	<b>7,823</b>	<b>3,762</b>	<b>2,335</b>	<b>1,984</b>
<b>Potential movements in actual borrowing</b>				
Movement in the CFR (above)	-	<b>3,762</b>	<b>2,335</b>	<b>1,984</b>
Externalisation of pre 2017/18 internal borrowing	-	24,740	-	-
Replacement Borrowing	-	5,509	5,010	5,011
<b>Total potential new borrowing</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>34,011</b>	<b>7,345</b>	<b>6,995</b>

#### 3.2 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council's appointed treasury advisor is Capita Asset Services and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Appendix 3 draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. The following table gives the Capita central view.

Annual Average (%)	Bank Rate (%)	PWLB Borrowing Rates (including certainty rate adjustment)		
		5 year	25 year	50 year
December 2016	0.25	1.60	2.90	2.70
March 2017	0.25	1.60	2.90	2.70
June 2017	0.25	1.60	2.90	2.70
September 2017	0.25	1.60	2.90	2.70
December 2017	0.25	1.60	3.00	2.80
March 2018	0.25	1.70	3.00	2.80
June 2018	0.25	1.70	3.00	2.80
September 2018	0.25	1.70	3.10	2.90
December 2018	0.25	1.80	3.10	2.90
March 2019	0.25	1.80	3.20	3.00
June 2019	0.50	1.90	3.20	3.00
September 2019	0.50	1.90	3.30	3.10
December 2019	0.75	2.00	3.30	3.10
March 2020	0.75	2.00	3.40	3.20

The Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25% on 4th August in order to counteract what it forecast was going to be a sharp slowdown in growth in the second half of 2016. It also gave a strong steer that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again by the end of the year. However, economic data since August has indicated much stronger growth in the second half 2016 than that forecast; also, inflation forecasts have risen substantially as a result of a continuation of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since early August. Consequently, Bank Rate was not cut again in November and, on current trends, it now appears unlikely that there will be another cut, although that cannot be completely ruled out if there was a significant dip downwards in economic growth. During the two-year period 2017 – 2019, when the UK is negotiating the terms for withdrawal from the EU, it is likely that the MPC will do nothing to dampen growth prospects, (i.e. by raising Bank Rate), which will already be adversely impacted by the uncertainties of what form Brexit will eventually take. Accordingly, a first increase to 0.50% is not tentatively penciled in, as in the table above, until quarter 2 2019, after those negotiations have been concluded, (though the period for negotiations could be extended). However, if strong domestically generated inflation, (e.g. from wage increases within the UK), were to emerge, then the pace and timing of increases in Bank Rate could be brought forward.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.



The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected that at some point, there would be a start to a switch back from bonds to equities after a historic long term trend over about the last twenty five years of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial quantitative easing purchases of bonds, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising prices of bonds. The opposite side of this coin has been a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election, has called into question whether, or when, this trend has, or may, reverse, especially when America is likely to lead the way in reversing monetary policy. Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as strong economic growth becomes more firmly established. The expected substantial rise in the Fed. rate over the next few years may make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US would be likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in other developed countries but the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong, or weak, the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress in the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

PWLB rates and gilt yields have been experiencing exceptional levels of volatility that have been highly correlated to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. It is likely that these exceptional levels of volatility could continue to occur for the foreseeable future.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is to the downside, particularly in view of the current uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit and the timetable for its implementation.

Apart from the above uncertainties, downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:-

- Monetary policy action by the central banks of major economies reaching its limit of effectiveness and failing to stimulate significant sustainable growth, combat the threat of deflation and reduce high levels of debt in some countries, combined with a lack of adequate action from national governments to promote growth through structural reforms, fiscal policy and investment expenditure.
- Major national polls:
  - Italian constitutional referendum 4.12.16;
  - Spain has a minority government with only 137 seats out of 350 after already having had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016. This is potentially highly unstable.
  - Dutch general election 15.3.17;
  - French presidential election April/May 2017;
  - French National Assembly election June 2017;
  - German Federal election August – October 2017.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with Greece being a particular problem, and stress arising from disagreement between EU countries on free movement of people and how to handle a huge influx of immigrants and terrorist threats
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks, especially Italian.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, causing a significant increase in safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.

- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US. The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates, include: -
- UK inflation rising to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium in gilt yields.
- A rise in US Treasury yields as a result of Fed. funds rate increases and rising inflation expectations in the USA, dragging UK gilt yields upwards.
- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- A downward revision to the UK's sovereign credit rating undermining investor confidence in holding sovereign debt (gilts).

### **Investment and borrowing rates**

Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2017/18 and beyond;

Borrowing interest rates have been on a generally downward trend during most of 2016 up to mid-August; they fell sharply to historically phenomenally low levels after the referendum and then even further after the MPC meeting of 4th August when a new package of quantitative easing purchasing of gilts was announced. Gilt yields have since risen sharply due to a rise in concerns around a 'hard Brexit', the fall in the value of sterling, and an increase in inflation expectations. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;

There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

### **3.3 Borrowing Strategy**

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This approach is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is high, and will continue to be followed where appropriate (see 3.3.1 below for a more detailed consideration of internal and external borrowing). As part of this strategy the ability to externally borrow to repay the reserves and balances if needed is important. Table 3.1 indicates that £24.740m may need to be externally borrowed if urgently required. This is the amount of council reserves and balances used in the past to fund the capital programme instead of taking out borrowing.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2017/18 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:-

- if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered if it is cost effective to do so.

- If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years

Any decisions will be reported to the Audit Committee at the next available opportunity.

### **3.3.1 External v. internal borrowing**

Current conditions indicate a need for a flexible approach to the choice between internal and external borrowing. Many of the factors which lay behind previous policies to externalise all borrowing remain valid, e.g.:-

- With a continuing historically abnormally low Bank Rate and PWLB rates, there remains a unique opportunity for local authorities to actively manage their strategy of undertaking new external borrowing.

However, it remains the case that there are certain limitations to this approach, as previously noted, e.g.:-

- The policy can cause exposure to credit risk (e.g. risk of the bank defaulting on the debt), so this aspect must be very carefully managed;
- Careful on going consideration needs to be given to the difference between borrowing rates and investment rates to ensure the Council obtains value for money once an appropriate level of risk management has been attained to ensure the security of its investments.

In favour of internalisation, over the medium term investment rates are expected to continue to be below long term borrowing rates. This means that value for money considerations would indicate that value could best be obtained by avoiding new external borrowing and by using internal cash balances to finance new capital expenditure, or to replace maturing external debt (this is referred to as internal borrowing). This would maximise short term savings.

However, short term savings by avoiding new long term external borrowing in 2016/17 must also be weighed against the potential for incurring additional long term extra costs, by delaying unavoidable new external borrowing until later years when PWLB long term rates are forecast to be higher. Additionally, the cash flow implications of internalising borrowing require regular review and will limit the potential extent of internalising borrowing.

Against this background, caution will be adopted with the 2017/18 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor the interest rate market and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances, reporting any decisions to the appropriate decision making body at the earliest opportunity.

### **3.4 Policy on borrowing in advance of need**

The Council will not borrow more than, or in advance of, its needs, solely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

In determining whether borrowing will be undertaken in advance of need the Council will:-

- ensure that there is a clear link between the capital programme and maturity profile of the existing debt portfolio which supports the need to take funding in advance of need;
- ensure the ongoing revenue liabilities created, and the implications for the future plans and budgets, have been considered;
- evaluate the economic and market factors that might influence the manner and timing of any decision to borrow;
- consider the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of funding;
- consider the alternative interest rate bases available, the most appropriate periods to fund and repayment profiles to use; and
- consider the impact of borrowing in advance on temporarily (until required to finance capital expenditure) increasing investment cash balances and the consequent increase in exposure to counterparty risk, and other risks, and the level of such risks given the controls in place to minimise them.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

### **3.5 Debt Rescheduling**

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (i.e. premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:-

- the generation of cash savings and/or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the Audit Committee, at the earliest practicable meeting following its action. A recent review of this highlighted that it would cost the council more to reschedule debt than it would save in interest due to significant early repayment premiums imposed by the PWLB.

## **4. Annual Investment Strategy**

### **4.1 Investment Policy**

The Council's investment policy has regard to the Welsh Government's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross-Sectorial Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the Welsh Government and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

As with previous practice, ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as “credit default swaps” and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 5 under the ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments categories.

The Council will also from time to time, make loans, deposits and investments ‘for the purpose of delivery of its Service’s (policy investments). These transactions will require the authority of the County Council for amounts over £100k. All transactions will be subject to adequate credit quality and the approval of the Section 151 Officer in consultation with the Portfolio Holder for Finance.

## **4.2 Creditworthiness policy**

The primary principle governing the Council’s investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:-

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council’s prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Section151 Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the criteria set out in Appendix 6 and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Credit rating information is supplied by Capita Asset Services, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of a possible longer term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita creditworthiness service.

As an additional layer to the minimum credit rating criteria described above, this Council also employs the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:-

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads from which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council at the discretion of the S151 Officer, to assist in determining the duration for investments. The Council will, therefore, normally use counterparties within the following durational bands:-

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

The Capita Asset Services creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and, by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Reference will also be made to other market data and market information, as available and as appropriate.

### 4.3 Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 7. This list will be added to or deducted from by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

### 4.4 Investment Strategy

**In-house funds:** . Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

**Investment returns expectations:** Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.25% until quarter 2 2019 and not to rise above 0.75% by quarter 1 2020. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2016/17 0.25%
- 2017/18 0.25%
- 2018/19 0.25%
- 2019/20 0.50%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:-

2017/18 0.25%  
2018/19 0.25%  
2019/20 0.50%  
2020/21 0.75%  
2021/22 1.00%  
2022/23 1.50%  
2023/24 1.75%  
Later years 2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently probably slightly skewed to the downside in view of the uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit. If growth expectations disappoint and inflationary pressures are minimal, the start of increases in Bank Rate could be pushed back. On the other hand, should the pace of growth quicken and / or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk i.e. Bank Rate increases occur earlier and / or at a quicker pace.

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access and notice accounts and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest

### 4.5 End of Year Investment Report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

### 4.6 External Fund Managers

The Council has not appointed external fund managers. The need for this will be kept under review and a reported as appropriate before such an appointment is made.

#### **4.7 Policy on the use of External Service Providers**

In order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources, the Council uses Capita Assets Services as its external treasury management advisors. The terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Final responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council.

#### **4.8 Delegation**

The Treasury Management scheme of delegation and the role of the Section 151 Officer are outlined in Appendix 8.

#### **APPENDICES**

1. Loan maturity profile
2. MRP Policy Statement
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background
5. Specified and non-specified investments
6. Counterparty criteria
7. Approved countries for investments
8. Treasury management scheme of delegation and the role of the section 151 officer.
9. Treasury Management Key Principles
10. Treasury Management Policy Statement
11. Prudential and Treasury Indicators
12. Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators



DADANSODDIAD BENTHYCIADAU YN AEDDFEDU 2016/17 YMLAEN / LOANS MATURITY ANALYSIS 2016/17 ONWARDS						
	PWLB Aeddefedu/ PWLB Maturity £'000	PWLB EIP/ Annuity/ PWLB EIP/ Annuity £'000	Benthyciadau Marchnad/ Market Loans £'000	PWLB Amrywiol/ PWLB Variable £'000	Cyfanswm yn Aeddfedu/ Total Maturing £'000	%Yn Aeddfedu o'r Cyfran yn sefyll/ Maturing of Total Outstanding %
2016/17	0	4	0	0	4	0.0
2017/18	5,500	9	0	0	5,509	5.0
2018/19	5,000	10	0	0	5,010	4.5
2019/20	5,000	11	0	0	5,011	4.5
2020/21	4,500	12	0	0	4,512	4.1
2021/22	0	14	0	0	14	0.0
2022/23	2,285	15	0	0	2,300	1.7
2023/24	1,854	16	0	0	1,870	2.1
2024/25	0	18	0	0	18	0.0
2025/26	0	20	0	0	20	0.0
2026/27	1,381	22	0	0	1,403	1.3
2027/28	2,165	24	0	0	2,189	2.0
2028/29	262	26	0	0	288	0.3
2029/30	1,538	21	0	0	1,559	1.4
2030/31	451	15	0	0	466	0.4
2031/32	1,941	9	0	0	1,950	1.8
2032/33	315	8	0	0	323	0.3
2033/34	637	0	0	0	637	0.6
2034/35	624	0	0	0	624	0.6
2035/36	611	0	0	0	611	0.6
2036/37	599	0	0	0	599	0.5
2037/38	587	0	0	0	587	0.5
2038/39	225	0	0	0	225	0.2
2039/40	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2040/41	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.2
2042/43	1,000	0	0	0	1,000	0.9
2043/44	1,020	0	0	0	1,020	0.9
2044/45	1,010	0	0	0	1,010	0.9
2045/46	11,464	0	0	0	11,464	10.3
2050/51	2,000	0	0	0	2,000	1.8
2052/53	28,238	0	0	0	28,238	25.4
2054/55	3,000	0	0	0	3,000	2.7
2055/56	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.2
2056/57	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2057/58	8,513	0	0	0	8,513	7.7
2059/60	1,763	0	0	0	1,763	1.6
	<b>110,483</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>110,739</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Cyfartaledd bywyd (blynnyddoedd)/ Average life(years)	22.31	8.80	0.00	0.00	22.27	
Cyfartaledd graddfa (%)/ Average rate (%)	5.41	9.41	0.00	0.00	5.42	

**Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2017/18**

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated Council Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision (MRP)), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision (VRP)).

The Welsh Government regulations require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:-

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or for capital expenditure from 1 April 2008 financed supported capital expenditure for Revenue Support Grant purposes, the MRP policy will be to charge 4% of the CFR at the end of the preceding year (in accordance with option 2 of the statutory guidance).

From 1st April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be the Asset Life method, with the MRP based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (in accordance with option 3 of the statutory guidance). The estimated life periods will be set by the S151 Officer based upon advice received from the relevant officers.

As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Council are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. Also, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.

The Housing Revenue Account share of the CFR is subject to a 2% MRP charge, based upon the closing CFR for the previous year, in line with the approved 30 year business plan.

Any repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

## Rhagolygon Graddfeydd Llog 2016/2019 Interest Rate Forecasts 2016/2019

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Dec-19	Mar-20
<b>Bank Rate View</b>	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%	0.40%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.90%
6 Month LIBID	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.50%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	1.00%
12 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.70%	0.70%	0.70%	0.70%	0.70%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.00%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
<b>Bank Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%
Capital Economics	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.75%
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.00%
Capital Economics	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	1.95%	2.05%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.60%	2.80%	3.20%	3.30%
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%
Capital Economics	2.30%	2.35%	2.45%	2.50%	2.55%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	3.00%	3.20%	3.60%	3.70%
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%
Capital Economics	2.90%	3.00%	3.05%	3.10%	3.15%	3.25%	3.30%	3.35%	3.45%	3.55%	3.75%	4.15%	4.35%
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
Capital Economics	2.80%	2.85%	2.95%	3.00%	3.05%	3.10%	3.15%	3.20%	3.30%	3.50%	3.70%	4.10%	4.20%

*Rhan o gyngor dderbyniwyd gan / An extract from advice received from: Capita Asset Services*

## Economic Background

### United Kingdom

GDP growth rates in 2013, 2014 and 2015 of 2.2%, 2.9% and 1.8% were some of the strongest rates among the G7 countries. Growth is expected to have strengthened in 2016 with the first three quarters coming in respectively at +0.4%, +0.7% and +0.5%. The latest Bank of England forecast for growth in 2016 as a whole is +2.2%. The figure for quarter 3 was a pleasant surprise which confounded the downbeat forecast by the Bank of England in August of only +0.1%, (subsequently revised up in September, but only to +0.2%). During most of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, and from the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme.

The referendum vote for Brexit in June 2016 delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys at the beginning of August, which were interpreted by the Bank of England in its August Inflation Report as pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, the following monthly surveys in September showed an equally sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys so that it is generally expected that the economy will post reasonably strong growth numbers through the second half of 2016 and also in 2017, albeit at a slower pace than in the first half of 2016.

The Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 4th August was therefore dominated by countering this expected sharp slowdown and resulted in a package of measures that included a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, a renewal of quantitative easing, with £70bn made available for purchases of gilts and corporate bonds, and a £100bn tranche of cheap borrowing being made available for banks to use to lend to businesses and individuals.

The MPC meeting of 3 November left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.25% and other monetary policy measures also remained unchanged. This was in line with market expectations, but a major change from the previous quarterly Inflation Report MPC meeting of 4 August, which had given a strong steer, in its forward guidance, that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again, probably by the end of the year if economic data turned out as forecast by the Bank.

The latest MPC decision included a forward view that Bank Rate could go either up or down depending on how economic data evolves in the coming months. Our central view remains that Bank Rate will remain unchanged at 0.25% until the first increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 2019 (unchanged from our previous forecast). However, we would not, as yet, discount the risk of a cut in Bank Rate if economic growth were to take a significant dip downwards, though we think this is unlikely. We would also point out that forecasting as far ahead as mid 2019 is highly fraught as there are many potential economic headwinds which could blow the UK economy one way or the other as well as political developments in the UK, (especially over the terms of Brexit), EU, US and beyond, which could have a major impact on our forecasts.

The pace of Bank Rate increases in our forecasts has been slightly increased beyond the three year time horizon to reflect higher inflation expectations.

The August quarterly Inflation Report was based on a pessimistic forecast of near to zero GDP growth in quarter 3 i.e. a sharp slowdown in growth from +0.7% in quarter 2, in reaction to the shock of the result of the referendum in June. However, consumers have very much stayed in a 'business as usual' mode and there has been no sharp downturn in spending; it is consumer expenditure that underpins the services sector which comprises about 75% of UK GDP. After a fairly flat three months leading up to October, retail sales in October surged at the strongest rate since September 2015. In addition, the GfK consumer confidence index has recovered quite strongly to -3 in October after an initial sharp plunge in July to -12 in reaction to the referendum result.

Bank of England GDP forecasts in the November quarterly Inflation Report were as follows, (August forecasts in brackets) - 2016 +2.2%, (+2.0%); 2017 1.4%, (+0.8%); 2018 +1.5%, (+1.8%). There has, therefore, been a sharp increase in the forecast for 2017, a marginal increase in 2016 and a small decline in growth, now being delayed until 2018, as a result of the impact of Brexit.

Capital Economics' GDP forecasts are as follows: 2016 +2.0%; 2017 +1.5%; 2018 +2.5%. They feel that pessimism is still being overdone by the Bank and Brexit will not have as big an effect as initially feared by some commentators.

The Chancellor has said he will do 'whatever is needed' i.e. to promote growth; there are two main options he can follow – fiscal policy e.g. cut taxes, increase investment allowances for businesses, and/or increase government expenditure on infrastructure, housing etc. This will mean that the PSBR deficit elimination timetable will need to slip further into the future as promoting growth, (and ultimately boosting tax revenues in the longer term), will be a more urgent priority. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (i.e. without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting to boost economic growth and suggested that the Government would need to help growth e.g. by increasing investment expenditure and by using fiscal policy tools. The newly appointed Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, announced, in the aftermath of the referendum result and the formation of a new Conservative cabinet, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 would be eased in the Autumn Statement on 23 November.

The other key factor in forecasts for Bank Rate is inflation where the MPC aims for a target for CPI of 2.0%. The November Inflation Report included an increase in the peak forecast for inflation from 2.3% to 2.7% during 2017; (Capital Economics are forecasting a peak of 3.2% in 2018). This increase was largely due to the effect of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since the referendum, (16% down against the US dollar and 11% down against the Euro); this will feed through into a sharp increase in the cost of imports and materials used in production in the UK. However, the MPC is expected to look through the acceleration in inflation caused by external, (outside of the UK), influences, although it has given a clear warning that if wage inflation were to rise significantly as a result of these cost pressures on consumers, then they would take action to raise Bank Rate.

What is clear is that consumer disposable income will come under pressure, as the latest employers' survey is forecasting median pay rises for the year ahead of only 1.1% at a time when inflation will be rising significantly higher than this. The CPI figure for October surprised by under shooting forecasts at 0.9%. However, producer output prices rose at 2.1% and core inflation was up at 1.4%, confirming the likely future upwards path.

Gilt yields, and consequently PwLB rates, have risen sharply since hitting a low point in mid-August. There has also been huge volatility during 2016 as a whole. The year started with 10 year gilt yields at 1.88%, fell to a low point of 0.53% on 12 August, and have hit a peak on the way up again of 1.46% on 14 November. The rebound since August reflects the initial combination of the yield-depressing effect of the MPC's new round of quantitative easing on 4 August, together with expectations of a sharp downturn in expectations for growth and inflation as per the pessimistic Bank of England Inflation Report forecast, followed by a sharp rise in growth expectations since August when subsequent business surveys, and GDP growth in quarter 3 at +0.5% q/q, confounded the pessimism. Inflation expectations also rose sharply as a result of the continuing fall in the value of sterling.

Employment has been growing steadily during 2016, despite initial expectations that the referendum would cause a fall in employment. However, the latest employment data in November, (for October), showed a distinct slowdown in the rate of employment growth and an increase in the rate of growth of the unemployment claimant count. House prices have been rising during 2016 at a modest pace but the pace of increase has been slowing since the referendum; a downturn in prices could dampen consumer confidence and expenditure.

### **United States of America**

The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the quarterly growth rate leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 at +0.8%, (on an annualised basis), and quarter 2 at 1.4% left average growth for the first half at a weak 1.1%. However, the first estimate for quarter 3 at 2.9% signalled a rebound to strong growth. The Fed. embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase which is now strongly expected in December 2016. Overall, despite some data setbacks, the US is still, probably, the best positioned of the major world economies to make solid progress towards a combination of strong growth, full employment and rising inflation: this is going to require the central bank to take action to raise rates so as to make progress towards normalisation of monetary policy, albeit at lower central rates than prevailed before the 2008 crisis.

The result of the presidential election in November is expected to lead to a strengthening of US growth if Trump's election promise of a major increase in expenditure on infrastructure is implemented. This policy is also likely to strengthen inflation pressures as the economy is already working at near full capacity. In addition, the unemployment rate is at a low point verging on what is normally classified as being full employment. However, the US does have a substantial amount of hidden unemployment in terms of an unusually large, (for a developed economy), percentage of the working population not actively seeking employment.

Trump's election has had a profound effect on the bond market and bond yields have risen sharply in the week since his election. Time will tell if this is a temporary over reaction, or a reasonable assessment of his election promises to cut taxes at the same time as boosting expenditure. This could lead to a sharp rise in total debt issuance from the current level of around 72% of GDP towards 100% during his term in office. However, although the Republicans now have a monopoly of power for the first time since the 1920s, in having a President and a majority in both Congress and the Senate, there is by no means any certainty that the politicians and advisers he has been appointing to his team, and both houses, will implement the more extreme policies that Trump outlined during his election campaign. Indeed, Trump may even rein back on some of those policies himself.

The election does not appear likely to have much impact on the Fed. in terms of holding back further on increasing the Fed. Rate. Accordingly, the next rate rise is still widely expected to occur in December 2016, followed by sharper increases thereafter, which may also cause Treasury yields to rise further. If the Trump package of policies is fully implemented, there is likely to be a significant increase in inflationary pressures which could, in turn, mean that the pace of further Fed. Rate increases will be quicker and stronger than had been previously expected.

In the first week since the US election, there has been a major shift in investor sentiment away from bonds to equities, especially in the US. However, gilt yields in the UK and bond yields in the EU have also been dragged higher. Some commentators are saying that this rise has been an overreaction to the US election result which is likely to be reversed. Other commentators take the view that this could well be the start of the long expected eventual unwinding of bond prices propelled upwards to unrealistically high levels, (and conversely bond yields pushed down), by the artificial and temporary power of quantitative easing.

## Eurozone

In the Eurozone, the ECB commenced, in March 2015, its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month. This was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March 2016 meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise significantly from low levels towards the target of 2%.

EZ GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2016 has been 0.5%, +0.3% and +0.3%, (+1.6% y/y). Forward indications are that economic growth in the EU is likely to continue at moderate levels. This has added to comments from many forecasters that those central banks in countries around the world which are currently struggling to combat low growth, are running out of ammunition to stimulate growth and to boost inflation. Central banks have also been stressing that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand and economic growth in their economies.

There are also significant specific political and other risks within the EZ: -

- Greece continues to cause major stress in the EU due to its tardiness and reluctance in implementing key reforms required by the EU to make the country more efficient and to make significant progress towards the country being able to pay its way – and before the EU is prepared to agree to release further bail out funds.
- Spain has had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016, both of which failed to produce a workable government with a majority of the 350 seats. At the eleventh hour on 31 October, before it would have become compulsory to call a third general election, the party with the biggest bloc of seats (137), was given a majority confidence vote to form a government. This is potentially a highly unstable situation, particularly given the need to deal with an EU demand for implementation of a package of austerity cuts which will be highly unpopular.
- The under capitalisation of Italian banks poses a major risk. Some German banks are also undercapitalised, especially Deutsche Bank, which is under threat of major financial penalties from regulatory authorities that will further weaken its capitalisation. What is clear is that national governments are forbidden by EU rules from providing state aid to bail out those banks that are at risk, while, at the same time, those banks are unable realistically to borrow additional capital in financial markets due to their vulnerable financial state. However, they are also 'too big, and too important to their national economies, to be allowed to fail'.
- 4 December Italian constitutional referendum on reforming the Senate and reducing its powers; this has also become a confidence vote on Prime Minister Renzi who originally said he would resign if there is a 'no' vote, but has since back tracked on that in the light of adverse poll predictions. A rejection of these proposals would stop progress to fundamental political and economic reform which is urgently needed to deal with Italy's core problems, especially low growth and a very high debt to GDP ratio of 135%. They are also intended to give Italy more stable government as no western European country has had such a multiplicity of governments since the Second World War as Italy, due to the equal split of power between the two chambers of the Parliament which are both voted in by the Italian electorate but by using different voting systems. It is unclear what the political, and other, repercussions could be if there is a 'No' vote.

- Dutch general election 15.3.17; a far right party is currently polling neck and neck with the incumbent ruling party. In addition, anti-big business and anti-EU activists have already collected two thirds of the 300,000 signatures required to force a referendum to be taken on approving the EU – Canada free trade pact. This could delay the pact until a referendum in 2018 which would require unanimous approval by all EU governments before it can be finalised. In April 2016, Dutch voters rejected by 61.1% an EU – Ukraine cooperation pact under the same referendum law. Dutch activists are concerned by the lack of democracy in the institutions of the EU.
- French presidential election; first round 13 April; second round 7 May 2017.
- French National Assembly election June 2017.
- German Federal election August – 22 October 2017. This could be affected by significant shifts in voter intentions as a result of terrorist attacks, dealing with a huge influx of immigrants and a rise in anti EU sentiment.
- The core EU, (note, not just the Eurozone currency area), principle of free movement of people within the EU is a growing issue leading to major stress and tension between EU states, especially with the Visegrad bloc of former communist states. Given the number and type of challenges the EU faces in the next eighteen months, there is an identifiable risk for the EU project to be called into fundamental question. The risk of an electoral revolt against the EU establishment has gained traction after the shock results of the UK referendum and the US Presidential election. But it remains to be seen whether any shift in sentiment will gain sufficient traction to produce any further shocks within the EU.

## **Asia**

Economic growth in China has been slowing down and this, in turn, has been denting economic growth in emerging market countries dependent on exporting raw materials to China. Medium term risks have been increasing in China e.g. a dangerous build up in the level of credit compared to the size of GDP, plus there is a need to address a major over supply of housing and surplus industrial capacity, which both need to be eliminated. This needs to be combined with a rebalancing of the economy from investment expenditure to consumer spending. However, the central bank has a track record of supporting growth through various monetary policy measures, though these further stimulate the growth of credit risks and so increase the existing major imbalances within the economy.

Economic growth in Japan is still patchy, at best, and skirting with deflation, despite successive rounds of huge monetary stimulus and massive fiscal action to promote consumer spending. The government is also making little progress on fundamental reforms of the economy.

## **Emerging countries**

There have been major concerns around the vulnerability of some emerging countries exposed to the downturn in demand for commodities from China or to competition from the increase in supply of American shale oil and gas reaching world markets. The ending of sanctions on Iran has also brought a further significant increase in oil supplies into the world markets. While these concerns have subsided during 2016, if interest rates in the USA do rise substantially over the next few years, (and this could also be accompanied by a rise in the value of the dollar in exchange markets), this could cause significant problems for those emerging countries with large amounts of debt denominated in dollars. The Bank of International Settlements has recently released a report that \$340bn of emerging market corporate debt will fall due for repayment in the remaining two months of 2016 and in 2017 – a 40% increase on the figure for the last three years.

Financial markets could also be vulnerable to risks from those emerging countries with major sovereign wealth funds, that are highly exposed to the falls in commodity prices from the levels prevailing before 2015, especially oil, and which, therefore, may have to liquidate substantial amounts of investments in order to cover national budget deficits over the next few years if the price of oil does not return to pre-2015 levels.



### **Brexit timetable and process**

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. This period can be extended with the agreement of all members i.e. not that likely.
- UK continues as an EU member during this two-year period with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK may also exit without any such agreements.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.
- It is possible that some sort of agreement could be reached for a transitional time period for actually implementing Brexit after March 2019 so as to help exporters to adjust in both the EU and in the UK.

## Specified and Non-Specified Investments

The Welsh Government 'Guidance on Local Government Investments' (Effective from 1 April 2010) provides the definition of specified and non-specified investments.

Paragraph 5.1 of the 'Guidance' states that an investment is specified if all of the following apply:-

- (a) the investment is denominated in sterling and any payments or repayments in respect of the investment are payable only in sterling; and
- (b) the investment is not a long-term investment (\*); and
- (c) the making of the investment is not defined as capital expenditure by virtue of regulation 20(1)(d) of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 [SI 3239 as amended]; and
- (ch) the investment is made with a body or in an investment scheme of high credit quality (\*\*); or with one of the following public-sector bodies:
  - (i) the United Kingdom Government
  - (ii) a local authority in England or Wales (as defined in section 23 of the 2003 Act) or a similar body in Scotland or Northern Ireland
  - (iii) a parish or community council.

The 'Guidance' also states that any investment not meeting the definition of paragraph 5.1 is classified as a non-specified investment.

During 2017/18 the Council does not intend to make any investments in foreign currencies, nor any with low credit quality bodies, nor any that are defined as capital expenditure by legislation (such as company shares). Non-specified investments will therefore be limited to (i) long-term investments; and (ii) deposits with the Council's own banker for transactional purposes if it fails to meet the basic credit criteria; in this instance balances will be minimised as far as is possible

The table in Appendix 6 set out the investment criteria and limits for the categories of investments intended for use during 2017/18 and therefore form the basis for the approved lending list.

Any proposed revisions or amendments during the year to the categories of specified and non-specified investments to be used and / or to the associated credit rating criteria / investment limits will be subject to prior approval by the County Council.

\* Section 2.4 of the 'Guidance' defines a long term investment as "any investment other than (a) one which is due to be repaid within 12 months of the date on which the investment was made or (b) one which the local authority may require to be repaid within that period."

\*\* For the purposes of high credit quality the 'Guidance' states that "for the purposes of paragraph 5.1(d), Welsh ministers recommend that the Strategy should define high credit quality (and where this definition refers to credit ratings, paragraph 6.1 (\*\*\*) is relevant)."

\*\*\* Paragraph 6.1 of the 'Guidance' recommends that "the Strategy should set out the authority's approach to assessing the risk of loss of investments, making clear in particular:

- (a) to what extent, if any, risk assessment is based upon credit ratings issued by one or more credit rating agencies;
- (b) where credit ratings are used, how frequently credit ratings are monitored and what action is to be taken when ratings change; and
- (c) what other sources of information on credit risk are used, additional to or instead of credit ratings."

The table in Appendix 6 of this strategy sets out what this Council defines as high credit quality and the associated investment criteria and limits and section 4.2 of this strategy sets out the Council's creditworthiness approach.

**Counterparty Criteria**

Category	Short Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Short Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Short Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Long Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Cash Limit	Time Limit
Bank and Building Societies (not nationalised or part nationalised)	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AAA	Aaa	AAA	£10m	5 years
	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AA	Aa2	AA	£10m	3 years
	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AA-	Aa3	AA-	£10m	364 days
	F1	P-1	A-1	A	A2	A	£7.5m	6 months
Nationalised / Part Nationalised UK Banks	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	£10m	364 days
UK Central Government (irrespective of credit rating)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	No maximum	No maximum
UK Local Authorities**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	£5m	364 days
Money Market Funds	n/a	n/a	n/a	AAA	AAA	AAA	£5m	6 months

\* as defined in the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003

\*\* as defined in the Local Government Act 2003

**Notes and Clarifications****(1) Cash Limit**

- (i) The cash limits apply both to the individual counterparty and to the overall group to which it belongs (e.g. for the banks within the Lloyds Banking Group plc (being Bank of Scotland plc and Lloyds Bank plc), the investment limit applies to those banks individually and the banking group as a whole);
- (ii) The overall cash limit for deposits over 364 days is £15m.

**(2) Time Limit**

- (i) This up to and including the period indicated.

**(3) Foreign Countries**

- (i) Investments in foreign countries will be limited to those that hold a sovereign credit rating of (Fitch) AA- or equivalent (from the agencies referred to in section 4.3 of this strategy) sovereign credit rating (based upon the lowest common denominator), and to a maximum of £10 million per foreign country.
- (ii) Investments in countries whose lowest sovereign rating is not AA- or above will not be permitted. No country limit will apply to investments in the UK, irrespective of the sovereign credit rating.
- (iii) Subsidiaries of foreign banking groups will normally be assessed according to the country of domicile of the parent organisation. However, Santander UK plc (a subsidiary of Spain's Banco Santander) will be classed as a UK bank due to its substantial UK franchises and the arms-length nature of the parent-subsidiary relationships.
- (iv) Sovereign credit rating criteria and foreign country limits will not apply to investments in multilateral development banks (e.g. the European Investment Bank and the World Bank) or other supranational organisations (e.g. the European Union).

**4. Credit Rating Downgrade**

Should a credit rating downgrade place a counterparty below the minimum credit rating criteria for investment, the counterparty will cease to be used as soon as practicable.

If the S151 Officer wishes to continue investing with that counterparty approval will be sought from the Chair of the Audit Committee plus one other member of the Chair's choosing, who both must approve the action. This will then be reported as appropriate at the next available opportunity.

**Approved countries for investments [correct as at 25 October 2016]**

*This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Capita Asset Services credit worthiness service.*

## AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

## AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

## AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar
- U.K.

## AA-

- Belgium

## Treasury management scheme of delegation

### (i) County Council

- budget approval;
- approval of the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy and MRP Policy, annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and amendments thereto;
- approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities; and
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee and/or Executive Committee.

### (ii) Executive Committee

- budget consideration;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and making recommendations to the County Council as appropriate;
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee.

### (iii) Audit Committee

- Scrutiny of Treasury Management matters as required by CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management and the Council's Treasury Management Policy. This includes:-
  - scrutinising the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and making recommendations to the Executive Committee and County Council as appropriate;
  - scrutinising proposals for amendments to the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and to the adopted clauses and making recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate;
  - receiving and scrutinising any other proposals relating to the treasury management which require a decision by the Executive or County Council; and
  - receiving and scrutinising monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and make recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate.

## The Treasury Management role of the Section 151 Officer

### The Section 151 (responsible) Officer's role includes:-

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit; and
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Responsibility for the execution and administration of its Treasury decisions, including decision on borrowing, investment and financing, have been delegated to the Section 151 Officer, who will act in accordance with the Council's policy statements and TMP's.

## The CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice

The key principles of CIPFA's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (2011 Edition)*, as described in Section 4 of that Code are as follows:-

### Key Principle 1:

Public service organisations should put in place formal and comprehensive objectives, policies and practices, strategies and reporting arrangements for the effective management and control of their treasury management activities.

### Key Principle 2:

Their policies and practices should make clear that the effective management and control of risks are prime objectives of their treasury management activities and that responsibility for these lies clearly within their organisations. Their appetite for risk should form part of their annual strategy, including any use of financial instruments for the prudent management of those risks, and should ensure that priority is given to security and liquidity when investing funds.

### Key Principle 3:

They should acknowledge that the pursuit of value for money in treasury management and the use of suitable performance measures are valid and important tools for responsible organisations to employ in support of their business and service objectives; and that, within the context of effective risk management, their treasury management policies and practices should reflect this.

The Code then goes on to say that:

“In framing these recommendations, CIPFA acknowledges the difficulties of striving for effective risk management and control, whilst at the same time pursuing value for money. This code does not seek to be prescriptive about how this issue should be handled, particularly since it covers such a wide variety of organisations. However, where appropriate, the sector specific guidance notes give suitable advice. CIPFA recognises that no two organisations in the public services are likely to tackle this issue in precisely the same manner but success in this area of treasury management is likely to be viewed, especially in value for money terms, as an indicator of a strongly performing treasury management function.”

“Even though it dates back to 1991, CIPFA considers that the report by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons on the BCCI closure is still pertinent, wherein it was stated that:”

*“In balancing risk against return, local authorities should be more concerned to avoid risks than to maximise returns.”*

“Indeed this view was supported by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report into local authority investments in 2009.”

“It is CIPFA’s view that throughout the public services the priority is to protect capital rather than to maximise return. The avoidance of all risk is neither appropriate nor possible. However, a balance must be struck with a keen responsibility for public money.”

Accordingly the Authority will adopt, as part of the standing orders, the following four clauses;

1. The Authority will create and maintain, as the cornerstones for effective treasury management:
  - a treasury management policy statement, stating the policies, objectives and approach to risk management of its treasury management activities; and
  - suitable treasury management practices (TMPs) setting out the manner in which the Authority will seek to achieve those policies and objectives, and prescribing how it will manage and control those activities.

The content of the Policy Statement and TMPs will follow the recommendations contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Code, subject only to amendment where necessary to reflect the particular circumstances of the Authority. Such amendments will not result in the Authority materially deviating from the Code's key principles.

2. The County Council, Executive Committee and the Audit Committee will receive reports on the Authority's treasury management policies, practices and activities, including; an annual strategy and plan in advance of the year, a mid-year review report and an annual report after its close, in the form prescribed in the TMPs.
3. The County Council/Executive Committee are responsible for the implementation of the Authority's treasury management policies and practices in accordance with the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation. The S151 Officer is responsible for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions, who will act in accordance with the Authority's policy statement and TMPs and, if he/she is a CIPFA member, CIPFA's Standard of Professional Practice on Treasury Management.
4. The Authority nominates Audit Committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies.

## Treasury Management Policy Statement

1. CIPFA defines its treasury management activities as: “The management of the authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks”.
2. This organisation regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organisation, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.
3. This organisation acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management.



**PRUDENTIAL & TREASURY INDICATORS  
BUDGET SETTING 2017/18**

**APPENDIX 11**

**No. Indicator**

		<b>2015/16 out-turn</b>	<b>2016/17 estimate</b>	<b>2017/18 proposal</b>	<b>2018/19 proposal</b>	<b>2019/20 proposal</b>
<b>Affordability</b>						
<b>1,2</b>	Estimates of [or actual] ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream:					
	Council Fund	6.26%	6.11%	6.50%	6.72%	6.89%
	Housing Revenue Account (inclusive of settlement)	23.14%	21.28%	19.38%	17.50%	15.99%
	Total	8.03%	7.76%	7.98%	8.04%	8.09%
<b>3</b>	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the Council Tax			£4.25	£22.00	£36.87
	<i>for the Band D Council Tax</i>					
<b>4 a</b>	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rents			£32.42	£18.83	£19.52
	<i>on average weekly rent levels</i>					
<b>4 b</b>	Estimates of incremental impact of capital borrowing on housing rents for HRA			£0.00	£0.00	£0.00
	<i>on average weekly rent levels</i>					
<b>Prudence</b>						
<b>5</b>	Gross debt and the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<i>Is the gross external debt &lt; the CFR for the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current and the next two financial years?</i>					
<b>Capital Expenditure</b>		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
<b>6,7</b>	Estimates of [or actual] capital expenditure					
	Council Fund	16,368	30,911	35,713	38,573	29,031
	Housing Revenue Account	27,608	12,151	9,889	7,283	7,523
	Total	43,976	43,062	45,602	45,856	36,554
<b>8,9</b>	Estimates of [or actual] Capital Financing Requirement					
	Council Fund	84,291	92,982	97,594	100,762	103,563
	Housing Revenue Account	43,365	42,497	41,648	40,815	39,999
	Total	127,656	135,479	139,242	141,577	143,562
<b>External Debt</b>		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
<b>10</b>	Authorised Limit					
	: General Borrowing	143,000	166,000	167,000	169,000	171,000
	: Other long term liabilities	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	145,000	169,000	170,000	172,000	174,000

11	HRA Limit on Indebtedness;					
	HRA Limit on Indebtedness	n/a	58,533	58,533	58,533	58,533
	HRA CFR	n/a	45,069	43,744	42,446	41,174
	HRA headroom	n/a	13,484	14,809	16,107	17,379
12	Operational Boundary					
	: General Borrowing	138,000	161,000	162,000	164,000	166,000
	: Other long term liabilities	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	140,000	164,000	165,000	167,000	169,000
13	Actual External Debt	110,744				
<b>Treasury Management</b>		<b>2015/16 out-turn</b>	<b>2016/17 estimate</b>	<b>2017/18 proposal</b>	<b>2018/19 proposal</b>	<b>2019/20 proposal</b>
14	The Local Authority has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
15	Gross and net debt	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<i>The upper limit on the net debt as a proportion of gross debt</i>					
16	The upper limit on fixed rate exposures: ( net principal outstanding)	143,000	166,000	167,000	169,000	171,000
17	The upper limit on variable rate exposures: ( net principal outstanding)	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
18	The limit for total principal sums invested for periods longer than 364 days (any long term investments carried forward from previous years will be included in each year's limit)	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
			<b>2016/17 upper limit</b>	<b>2016/17 lower limit</b>		
19	The upper and lower limits for the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing					
	• under 12 months		20%	0%		
	• 12 months and within 24 months		20%	0%		
	• 24 months and within 5 years		50%	0%		
	• 5 years and within 10 years		75%	0%		
	• 10 years and above		100%	0%		
			no change	no change		

## Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators (References as per appendix 11)

### Prudential Indicators

#### A) Affordability

##### 1,2 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

##### 3. Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

##### 4(a) Estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rent levels

Similar to the council tax calculation, this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of proposed changes in the housing capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing commitments and current plans, expressed as a discrete impact on weekly rent levels.

This indicator shows the revenue impact on any newly proposed changes, although any discrete impact will be constrained by rent controls.

##### 4(b) Estimates of incremental impact of capital borrowing on housing rents for HRA .

This indicator shows the additional cost of borrowing for HRA on rent amount.

#### B) Prudence

##### 5. Gross Debt and the CFR

The Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

## C) Capital expenditure

### 6,7. Estimates of Capital Expenditure

This is the forecast Capital Expenditure from 2016/17 to 2019/20, and is based on the Capital Programme for 2016/17 and the Capital Bids received for 2017/18.

### 8,9 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

Another prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has £nil of such schemes within the CFR.

## CH) External Debt

**10. The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

The S151 Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in the budget report.

**11. HRA Limit on Indebtedness.** As part of the HRA self-financing reform each Welsh local authority with responsibility for housing will be allocated a limit on indebtedness in relation to the HRA; this essentially places a limit on the HRA CFR (to be applied at 31st March each year). The gap between the two, if the CFR is within the limit, will be referred to as the borrowing headroom. The forecast account for the HRA settlement on the same basis as for the ratio in reference 2.

**12. The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

## **Treasury Management Indicators**

### **Treasury management limits on activity**

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:-

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates; and
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.